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Abstract: In December 2013 the National Bank of Belgium introduced a sectoral capital requirement 
aimed at strengthening the resilience of Belgian banks against adverse developments in the real 
estate market. This paper assesses the impact of this macroprudential measure on mortgage 
lending. Our results indicate that the sectoral capital requirement on average did not affect IRB 
banks’ mortgage rates and mortgage loan growth. However, the findings do indicate that IRB banks 
may have reacted heterogeneously to the introduction of the measure: capital-constrained banks 
with more exposures to the segment targeted by the additional requirement tend to respond stronger 
in terms of mortgage lending. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the Basel framework, capital requirements are a key tool to increase the resilience of the banking 
sector. Whereas the focus of minimum capital requirements is on the solvency position of individual 
banks, macroprudential requirements on top of the microprudential ones aim at preserving stability 
of the banking sector and financial stability as a whole. More specifically, the accumulation of capital 
buffers makes banks more resilient to negative shocks, thereby limiting the impact of downturns on 
the financial system and on the broader economy.  
Macroprudential capital requirements, while sharing the ultimate objective of safeguarding the 
stability of the financial system, differ in, inter alia, their scope of application. On the one hand, 
capital requirements can have a broad focus, applying to banks’ total risk weighted assets (RWA), as 
in the case of the countercyclical capital buffer and capital surcharges for globally or domestically 
systemically important institutions. On the other hand, capital requirements can be designed to 
shield the financial sector from risks emerging from specific sectoral exposures. In such cases, the 
additional requirement does not apply to banks’ total RWA but instead on specific portfolios in their 
balance sheets. 
Due to the detriment that systemic risks stemming from excessive developments in real estate 
markets can exert on financial stability1, sectoral capital requirements have been increasingly 
considered as macroprudential instruments to address vulnerabilities related to real estate 
exposures. In recent years, several European countries activated capital-based macroprudential 
instruments targeting real estate assets2, either directly, by setting higher capital ratio 
requirements for the concerned segments (e.g. the activation of a countercyclical capital buffer in 
Switzerland, with its scope of application to assets secured by real estate property), or indirectly, by 
adjusting parameters, such as risk weights (RW)3, which affect capital requirements for real estate 
exposures (e.g. a 25 percent RW floor on mortgage loans in Sweden, tighter criteria for the 
application of preferential RW to residential property in Croatia, Ireland and the UK, increased RW 
for exposures secured by commercial real estate properties in Ireland, Norway, Romania and 
Sweden). 
In December 2013, the National Bank of Belgium introduced a macroprudential measure aimed at 
strengthening the resilience of Belgian banks against adverse developments in the real estate 
                                                                
1 See for example Crowe et al. (2013) and Hartmann (2015). Claessens et al. (2009) show that financial and economic busts 
preceded by a real estate boom are particularly harmful from a financial stability perspective since they are longer and 
costlier than the average downturn. On the interplay between mortgage loan financing, leverage, real estate prices and the 
macro-economy, see for example Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Aoki et al. (2004), Davis and Heathcote (2005), Iacoviello (2005), 
Iacoviello and Neri (2010), Forlati and Lambertini, 2011), Kannan and Rabanal (2012). 
2 See ESRB (2016), “A Review of Macroprudential Policy in the EU in 2015” provides for a comprehensive overview of macroprudential policy 
in Europe. 
3 See Anderson et al. (2012) and Bank of England (2011) on the use of risk weights as macroprudential instruments.  
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market. The measure imposed a 5 percentage point add-on to the RW on Belgian residential real 
estate exposures for banks calculating regulatory capital requirements through an internal ratings-
based (IRB) approach. While the effects of capital-based measures in terms of increased capital 
available to absorb potential losses are readily measurable (for example, the Belgian measure 
entailed an increase in the average RW for IRB banks from 10 percent at the end of 2012 to 15 
percent at the end of 20134), their consequences on the supply and pricing of credit, being either 
intended or unintended, are more difficult to assess. This is due to the challenges of isolating the 
impact of policy changes from that of other developments that might have affected banks’ lending 
behaviour during the same period.  
This paper aims at quantifying the impact of the introduction of the macroprudential add-on to RW 
for domestic residential real estate exposures in Belgium on the pricing and growth of mortgage 
loans granted by Belgian IRB banks. Using bank-level data on mortgage loan portfolios, mortgage 
loan rates, regulatory capital requirements and additional bank balance sheet characteristics, we 
find that the sectoral capital requirement on average did not affect IRB banks’ mortgage rates and 
mortgage loan growth: the point estimate of the impact on mortgage rates is about 5 basis points, 
whereas the impact on mortgage loan growth is very close to zero, and neither one of these estimates 
is statistically significant.  
However, the findings do indicate that IRB banks may have reacted heterogeneously to the 
introduction of the RW add-on: IRB banks having a larger share of affected mortgage loans in their 
balance sheet and facing a relatively larger additional capital requirement due to the RW add-on 
reduce mortgage lending growth relatively more. In contrast, IRB banks with a larger voluntary 
management capital buffer exhibit stronger mortgage loan growth after the introduction of the 
measure. These effects are temporary, however, and no longer significant in the second year after 
the introduction. For mortgage rates, we find that IRB banks with a larger share of mortgage loans 
to Belgian households in their balance sheet increased mortgage rates relatively more in the first 
year after the introduction of the measure and charge relatively lower rates in the second year. IRB 
banks with a lower reliance on affected mortgage loans, in contrast, initially charged relatively lower 
mortgage rates and increased their price of mortgage loans relatively more only in the second year 
after the introduction. Simulations show that the initial impact on the mortgage rate of IRB banks 
with large reliance on mortgage loans to Belgian households is stronger than the subsequent impact 
on the mortgage rate of IRB banks with a lower share of mortgage loans in their balance sheet total. 
Yet, the overall effect on the mortgage rates and mortgage loan growth of individual banks in our 
sample remains limited in terms of both statistical and economic significance. 
                                                                
4 See the National Bank of Belgium’s “Financial Stability Report”, 2014. 
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By analysing the impact of a sectoral macroprudential measure on mortgage lending, this paper 
contributes to the literature on the impact of capital requirements on bank lending. The vast 
majority of this literature has focused on the changes to overall capital requirements, either 
following the introduction of the new Basel regulation, or due to changes in individual banks’ capital 
requirements. The analysis of the effects of sectoral capital requirements in general, and of those 
targeting real estate exposures in particular, is much less explored. This is not surprising, given the 
relatively recent experience with the introduction of such instruments, which leads to a scarcity of 
observations for a proper ex post policy assessment. To our knowledge, this paper is among the first 
to provide empirical evidence on the impact of introducing a sectoral macroprudential capital 
requirement on lending rates and growth. Documenting the impact of such macroprudential 
requirements is crucial for gaining experience with these instruments and for improving the 
effectiveness of macroprudential policies in general. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the recent 
literature on the effects of capital requirements on bank lending. In Section 3 we explain in more 
detail the Belgian macroprudential measure that is the focus of this paper. Sections 4 and 5 present 
the empirical specification and the data underlying our analysis, of which the results are discussed 
in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
2 LITERATURE ON THE EFFECTS OF (SECTORAL) CAPITAL 
REQUIREMENTS ON BANK LENDING 
Due to the increased emphasis on macroprudential policy in the aftermath of the financial crisis, a 
new body of studies in the already vast literature examining the costs and the benefits of capital 
requirements has flourished. However, a broad consensus has not yet been reached, neither 
regarding the positive effects of capital requirements on reducing the probability and the cost of 
crises, nor concerning the transmission of capital-based policy measures on the price and volume of 
credit (e.g. Galati and Moessner (2014), Tressel and Yuanyan (2016)).  
On the benefits side, capital requirements are expected to foster financial stability by reducing the 
probability of banks’ financial distress and by minimizing their losses given default. However, the 
evidence on both the effect of capital requirements on banks’ ex ante risk taking behaviour and on 
the ex post effectiveness in improving financial system resilience is mixed. While some studies 
confirm the positive effect of capital requirements in reducing banks’ risk taking (e.g. De Haan and 
Klomp (2012)), banks’ financial fragility (e.g. De Jonghe (2010), Miles et al. (2012), Diamond and 
Rajan (2001)), Baker and Wurgler (2015)) and the cost of banking crises (e.g. Dewatripont and Tirole 
(1994), Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010), Beltratti et al. (2012), 
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Kapan and Minoiu (2013)), others find either non-significant or even opposite results (e.g. Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache (2011)). 
The costs entailed by higher capital requirements can be quantified in terms of forgone lending and, 
possibly, reduced economic activity. Banks’ behaviour following the policy change is a key 
determinant of its transmission to lending volumes and lending rates. For an increase in capital 
requirements to exert an effect on banks’ lending decisions, banks need to consider equity more 
expensive than debt or that their voluntary management buffer held above minimum regulatory 
requirements falls below an internal or external target level.  
The empirical assessment of the effect of capital requirements on lending volumes and interest rates 
is challenging not only due to the shortage and/or strict confidentiality of data on past changes in 
bank capital requirements, let alone macroprudential capital requirements, but also because, for the 
observed changes, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of the regulation from other, broader, 
developments (e.g. Noss and Toffano (2016)). However, the increased availability of policy changes 
involving capital requirements, led an increasing number of authors to explore their effects on banks’ 
behaviour in terms of supply and pricing of credit. More specifically, this growing strand of literature 
based on a diversity of countries suggests that capital-based macroprudential regulation does affect 
bank lending and loan pricing (e.g. Martynova (2015) and Basel Committee of Banking Supervision 
(2016), and the references therein).   
Most of these empirical studies focus on assessing the impact of overall minimum regulatory capital 
requirements: given the rather recent experience with macroprudential capital requirements, and 
specifically sectoral capital requirements targeting mortgage lending, evidence on the impact of 
sectoral macroprudential capital requirements is scarce. Martins and Schechtman (2014) analyze the 
effectiveness of a within-sector bank regulation that was implemented in Brazil in December 2010 in 
response to increasing risk in the auto loan market in the context of rapid household credit growth. 
Regulatory RW were raised for targeted auto loans (high LTVs and long maturities) from 75% to 
150%, whereas other auto loans were not affected by the measure. They find that lending spreads 
charged on targeted loans increased by at least 2.19 percentage points more than on untargeted 
loans. This amounts to 15% of lending spreads, leading the authors to conclude that the effect was 
material. Martins and Schechtman (2014) also observe a (temporary) decline in lending volumes of 
targeted loans relative to a moderate increase pattern in untargeted loans, which is confirmed by 
Afanasieff et al. (2015). Gómez et al. (2017) identify the effect of macroprudential regulations in 
Colombia over the period 2006-2009. The tools applied include reserve requirements and dynamic 
provisioning on commercial loans. The latter has similarities to a sectoral capital buffer and is shown 
to have had a negative impact on credit growth and contributed to stabilise the credit cycle in 
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Colombia before the financial crisis in 2008-2009. Specifically on sectoral requirements targeting 
real estate exposures, Crowe et al. (2013), state that the empirical evidence on the impact of 
increased capital requirements and/or risk weights on particular groups of real estate loans is mixed: 
while some attempts (such as the cases of Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, and Ukraine) failed to stop the 
boom, others (such as the case of Poland) were at least a partial success. Closest to our paper, Basten 
and Koch (2017) examine the impact of the activation in February 2013 of a sectoral countercyclical 
capital buffer in Switzerland. This capital buffer of 1% targeting the residential mortgage market in 
Switzerland was introduced to protect the banking sector from the consequences of excessive credit 
growth by increasing its resilience. Furthermore, as a secondary objective the instrument should 
lean against the build-up of excesses. They find that while the sectoral countercyclical capital buffer 
did not affect banks’ rejection rates, both capital-constrained and mortgage-specialised banks 
exhibited higher offered mortgage rates after the introduction of the measure. Furthermore, 
mortgage-specialised banks reduced year on year mortgage loan growth by 0.19 percentage points 
after the activation. Basten and Koch (2017) conclude that the overall size of the identified effects is 
relatively small. 
By providing evidence on the impact of a sectoral macroprudential measure on mortgage rates and 
mortgage loan growth, we contribute to this scant literature on the impact of sectoral capital 
requirements on bank lending. Before turning to the empirical analysis, we explain in more detail 
the Belgian macroprudential measure that is the focus of this paper. 
3 THE BELGIAN MACROPRUDENTIAL MEASURE 
Macroprudential instruments targeting real estate exposures can be classified as either borrower-
based or capital-based. Borrower-based instruments act on the terms and conditions of credit, for 
example by imposing limits to the loan-to-value (the ratio between the size of the loan and the value 
of the financed property) or to the borrower’s debt service costs.5 Capital-based instruments affect 
banks’ balance sheets through changes in capital requirements, imposed either directly by setting 
higher regulatory capital ratio requirements for real estate exposures, or indirectly by acting on 
parameters, such as RW, which affect capital requirements.  
The Basel Accord foresees two possible methods for calculating capital requirements for retail 
mortgage loan exposures. The standardised (STA) approach applies a fixed RW (35 percent) to all 
exposures secured by mortgages on residential property, which is then used as a basis for computing 
the amount of capital required under Pillar I for this exposure class. The IRB approach allows banks 
to use internal models for estimating the key parameters (notably the probability of default and the 
                                                                
5 See for example the ESRB “Handbook on Operationalising macroprudential policy in the banking sector (2010)”. 
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loss given default) used as input in the Basel RW function for the calculation of the RW to be applied 
to the bank’s mortgage loan exposure.  
In Belgium, the STA approach is mainly used by small credit institutions, covering a small share of 
total mortgage loans held by the Belgian banking sector. A fact-finding exercise conducted by the 
National Bank of Belgium in 2012 revealed that RW on mortgage loans of Belgian banks using the 
IRB approach were not only substantially lower than those resulting from banks applying the STA 
approach but also on average quite low compared to those of other European countries.6 While the 
low level of IRB RW (on average 10 percent) can be justified by the absence of major downturn 
events in the historical credit loss data of the Belgian real estate market on which the model 
parameters are calibrated, the presence of pockets of vulnerabilities represented by segments of the 
outstanding mortgage loan portfolio (characterised by high loan-to-value ratios, high debt service 
ratios and long maturities) raised concerns over the resilience of Belgian banks against higher than 
expected losses that could result from abrupt developments in the Belgian real estate market. 
Against this background, the National Bank of Belgium introduced in December 2013 a 
macroprudential measure consisting in a 5 percentage point add-on to the RW on Belgian residential 
real estate exposures for banks calculating regulatory capital requirements through an IRB 
approach.7 The macroprudential measure was primarily aimed at increasing banks’ resilience 
against potential losses stemming from less buoyant conditions on the residential real estate market. 
The immediate effect of the measure in terms of increased capital to absorb potential losses is 
readily measurable: as a consequence of the policy, the average RW on mortgage loan exposures used 
as input for calculating the capital requirements of Belgian IRB banks increased from 10 percent to 
15 percent. At the sectoral level, the add-on resulted in a total additional capital requirement for all 
IRB banks in the sample of EUR 820 million (as of January 2014), representing in aggregate about 
1.8 percent of these banks’ outstanding Tier 1 capital. 
The objective of the add-on was not to curb the supply of credit per se. Yet, to the extent that banks 
perceive higher capital requirements as increasing their cost of funding (and/or as decreasing their 
voluntary management buffer above minimum requirements below an internal or external target), 
they may decide to pass on this perceived increase in funding cost to their customers. In the 
following sections we aim at quantifying to what extent Belgian IRB banks that were affected by the 
macroprudential measure indeed responded to its introduction by adjusting their mortgage loan 
pricing upward and/or by curbing mortgage loan growth. 
                                                                
6 See European Banking Authority, 2013, “Third interim report on the consistency of risk-weighted assets, SME and 
residential mortgages”.   
7 The choice to operate through RW rather than setting a higher regulatory capital requirement stems from restrictions in 
European legal framework (the Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive, CRR/CRD IV) laying out the prudential rules 
for the EU banking system. 
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4 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
To assess the impact of the macroprudential RW add-on on mortgage lending, we estimate the 
following equation: 
𝑌𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑏,𝑡  𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛𝑡) × 𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏𝑡) + 𝛾𝑏,𝑡𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛𝑡) + 𝛿𝑏,𝑡𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏𝑡) +  θ𝑋𝑏,𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝐸𝑏 + 𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑏,𝑡 
   (1) 
where 𝑌𝑏,𝑡 denotes either the mortgage loan rate charged by bank 𝑏 in month 𝑡 or the growth rate of 
bank b’s mortgage loan stock over the next 12 months relative to the level in month t. 𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛𝑡) is 
an indicator variable that equals one during the months in which the RW add-on is in place (from 
December 2013 onwards) and zero otherwise, 𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏𝑡) is an indicator variable that equals one for 
banks that use the IRB approach for determining the risk weights on mortgages and zero 
otherwise, 𝑋𝑏,𝑡−1 is a vector of bank-specific control variables, 𝐹𝐸𝑏 and 𝐹𝐸𝑡 denote bank and time 
fixed effects, respectively, and 𝜀𝑏,𝑡 is a normally distributed error term. 
The impact of the RW add-on on the mortgage loan spread is captured by the difference-in-
differences estimator 𝛽𝑏,𝑡, which is defined as 
𝛽𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑏,𝑡−1        (2) 
where 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑏,𝑡−1 is a subset of the vector of bank specific control variables 𝑋𝑏,𝑡−1that we interact with 
𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛𝑡) × 𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏𝑡) to measure differences in sensitivity of IRB banks to the RW add-on. To control 
for a potential change in the relationship between 𝑌𝑏,𝑡 and 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑏,𝑡−1 for both IRB and STA banks 
after the introduction of the macroprudential measure and for IRB banks having a sensitivity of 𝑌𝑏,𝑡 
to 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑏,𝑡−1different from that for STA banks at all times, 𝛾𝑏,𝑡 and 𝛿𝑏,𝑡 follow a similar specification. It 
should be noted that the constant terms 𝛾0 and 𝛿0 are not identified as a consequence of the inclusion 
of time and bank fixed effects, respectively. 
Equation (1) can be rewritten as 
𝑌𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽0 𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛𝑡) × 𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏𝑡)+𝛽1  𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛𝑡) × 𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏𝑡) × 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑏,𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛𝑡) × 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑏,𝑡−1 +
𝛿1𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏𝑡) × 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑏,𝑡−1 + θ𝑋𝑏,𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝐸𝑏 + 𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑏,𝑡  (3) 
The parameter 𝛽𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛽0 is obtained when the add-on indicator is not interacted with any sensitivity 
variables 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑏,𝑡−1 and therefore captures the average impact of the add-on on the IRB banks in the 
sample. When the variables in  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑏,𝑡−1 are included, 𝛽𝑏,𝑡 equals the expression in equation (2), 
which allows us to quantify any heterogeneous reactions of mortgage loan spreads across IRB banks. 
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5 DATA 
Our analysis relies on a sample of 14 Belgian banks, of which 8 use the IRB approach for the 
calculation of regulatory capital requirement (and are therefore directly affected by the 
macroprudential measure) and 6 using the STA approach. The data used are available at monthly 
frequency and span the period from January 2012 to December 2015, i.e. about two years before and 
after the introduction of the macroprudential measure in December 2013. 
The first dependent variable of interest is the interest rate applied to new mortgage loans to 
households in Belgium. The data on mortgage rates are obtained from the National Bank of 
Belgium’s MFI Interest Rate (MIR) statistics and cover four repricing segments: loans with repricing 
period up to 1 year, loans with repricing period between 1 and 5 years, loans with repricing period 
between 5 and 10 years, and loans with repricing period longer than 10 years. The MIR data contain 
monthly observations of individual banks’ average mortgage rates in each of the four repricing 
segments. Our dependent variable, the average mortgage loan rate, is expressed in basis points and 
amounts to the volume-weighted average rate charged on new loans by a bank in a given month 
across the four repricing segments. Summary statistics of mortgage rates are shown in Table 1. The 
table shows that the mortgage rates on average are almost 20 basis points lower for IRB banks than 
for STA banks, but the dispersion around the mean is large for both groups of banks. 
Our second dependent variable is the growth rate of a bank’s mortgage loan stock over the next 12 
months. The data to compute the mortgage growth rate is obtained from the National Bank of 
Belgium’s supervisory statistics.8 Table 1 indicates that IRB banks’ mortgage loan portfolios have 
grown stronger on average than those of STA banks during the sample period. However, like for 
mortgage rates, the dispersion around the means is large. 
Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics of the weighted average mortgage rate and mortgage loan growth 
between January 2012 and December 2015 for IRB and STA banks respectively, whereby the 
weights are given by the banks’ share in the total outstanding amount of mortgage loans to Belgian 
households. This period during which the macroprudential measure was in place is marked by the 
shaded area in Figure 1.  
The left-hand part of Figure 1 shows that, in line with the policy interest rate, mortgage rates follow 
a declining trend over the sample period. Furthermore, lending rates of IRB banks and STA banks 
exhibit on average a very large co-movement (the correlation between the two series amounts to 85 
                                                                
8 The mortgage growth rate is calculated as 100 ×
∑ (𝑆𝑏,𝑡+𝑖−𝑆𝑏,𝑡+𝑖−1−(𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑏,𝑡+𝑖+𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒−𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑏,𝑡+𝑖))
12
𝑖=1
𝑆𝑏,𝑡
, where 𝑆𝑏,𝑡 is the outstanding 
amount of loans to Belgian households for house purchase corrected for securitisations in month t. In contrast to the simple 
annual percentage change of the mortgage loan stock, this approach allows accounting for reclassifications and write-offs. 
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percent), suggesting the presence of common factors and/or endogenous behaviour (e.g. due to 
competition) that lead to very similar dynamics across the entire sector. 
Average mortgage loan growth rates in the right-hand part of Figure 1 indicate that the difference in 
dynamics between IRB banks and STA banks is somewhat larger for mortgage loan growth rates. In 
particular, the two series exhibit an opposing trend between January 2012 and July 2013. After that, 
the co-movement between the average mortgage loan growth rates of the two groups of banks is 
larger (correlation of 72 percent). 
Figure 1 - Evolution of weighted average mortgage rates and mortgage loan growth 
Mortgage rate (in basis points) 
 
Mortgage loan growth (in percent) 
 
Sources: NBB MIR statistics, NBB supervisory statistics (Schema A). 
Notes: The bold line denotes the weighted average for IRB banks, the dashed line denotes the weighted average for STA 
banks. The weights used for computing weighted averages are given by the banks’ share in the total outstanding amount of 
mortgage loans to Belgian households. The shaded area denotes the period during which the macroprudential measure was in 
place. 
To account for differences in mortgage rates and mortgage loan growth across banks and over time, 
we control for bank and time fixed effects in the sample. In addition, we consider a broad set of 
control variables obtained from Datastream and supervisory reporting9 as shown in Table 1. The 
swap rate, which proxies for the banks’ funding cost corresponding to the repricing profile their new 
mortgage production10, as on average very similar between IRB and STA banks. This also holds for 
the average share of new mortgage loan production in the four repricing segments: both IRB and 
STA banks on average tend to issue more loans with repricing periods longer than 10 years 
                                                                
9 The data on Belgian mortgage loans, total assets, total loans and deposits are at solo level and obtained from Schema A 
reports, whereas capital related variables are sourced from COREP. The Tier 1 capital ratio requirement results from the 
National Bank of Belgium’s Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) decisions regarding banks’ capital 
requirements. Capital ratio and requirement variables are at consolidated level. 
10 The 1 year swap rate is assigned to mortgage loans with repricing period up to 1 year, the 5 year swap rate to mortgage 
loans with repricing period between 1 and 5 years, the 10 year swap rate to mortgage loans with repricing period between 5 
and 10 years, and the 20 year swap rate to mortgage loans with repricing period longer than 10 years. Like the average 
mortgage loan rate, the swap rate is expressed in basis points and amounts to the volume-weighted average swap rate across 
the four repricing segments in a bank’s new mortgage loan production. 
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(Repricing segment 4). However, the dispersion around the means indicates a large variation over 
banks and/or time of the share of the repricing segments in new mortgage loans. The table further 
shows that IRB banks on average are significantly larger than STA banks (EUR 100 billion vs EUR 
3.58 billion). The average differences between IRB and STA banks seem relatively limited for the 
importance of Belgian mortgage loans in the balance sheet total and the loan to deposit ratio, but the 
dispersion around the mean is large for both groups of banks.  
Table 1 - Summary statistics 
  IRB banks STA banks 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Mortgage rate 343 317.02 64.21 186.07 463.11 207 334.19 144.58 168.65 995.00 
Mortgage loan growth 336 5.20 3.92 -4.10 17.17 195 3.04 11.54 -14.95 28.51 
Swap rate 343 153.81 48.18 48.52 268.62 207 150.05 58.05 13.7 265.99 
Repricing segment 1 343 6.79 7.47 0.00 36.59 207 11.66 17.49 0.00 100 
Repricing segment 2 343 20.74 18.38 0.21 82.08 207 21.92 25.79 0.00 100 
Repricing segment 3 343 17.71 16.88 0.17 65.29 207 10.96 13.14 0.00 100 
Repricing segment 4 343 54.76 30.38 0.00 97.76 207 55.47 31.04 0.00 100 
Total assets (EUR bill) 343 99.76 77.00 17.42 292.47 207 3.58 2.70 0.47 9.99 
Loan to deposit ratio 343 84.42 12.21 64.78 107.57 207 85.45 26.50 18.86 178.63 
Mortgage loans to total assets 343 28.35 15.46 12.03 57.64 207 30.55 17.73 7.86 63.05 
Additional capital to RWA 198 0.67 0.53 0.16 2.04 0     
Capital buffer to RWA 198 3.39 2.27 -2.43 11.33 0     
Source: NBB MIR statistics, NBB supervisory statistics (Schema A, COREP), NBB SREP, Datastream. 
Notes: We only show summary statistics for Additional capital to RWA for IRB banks after the introduction of the measure, as 
the additional capital requirement implied by the RW add-on is strictly positive only for IRB banks from December 2013 
onwards and zero otherwise. The number of observations for Capital buffer to RWA is lower due to data availability. 
The share of Belgian mortgage loans in total assets and the last two control variables in Table 1 are 
(also) used to assess to what extent IRB banks’ response to the macroprudential measure in terms of 
mortgage loan supply and pricing differs according to specific characteristics of IRB banks. In 
particular, the share of Belgian mortgage loan exposures in the banks’ total balance sheet and the 
additional capital required by the measure as a share of RWA capture the relative degree to which 
IRB banks are affected in terms of additional capital requirements following the increase in the risk 
weight.11 The capital buffer relative to RWA variable captures the degree to which the affected banks 
have room to absorb this additional capital requirement by reducing the voluntary management 
buffer they hold above minimum regulatory requirements. It should be noted that we only show 
summary statistics for Additional capital to RWA for IRB banks after the introduction of the 
measure, as the additional capital requirement implied by the RW add-on is strictly positive only for 
IRB banks from December 2013 onwards and zero otherwise. The number of observations for Capital 
buffer to RWA is lower due to data availability. Table 1 shows that the RW add-on results in 
additional required capital amounting to on average 0.67 percent of RWA, but this effect increases 
up to 2.04 percent for the bank that is most affected by the measure. The data indicate that IRB 
                                                                
11 The additional capital required by the measures is obtained by multiplying the amount of Belgian mortgage loans on the 
balance sheet with the bank’s Tier 1 capital requirement and the change in the mortgage loan RW introduced by the add-on 
(0.05). 
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banks on average have available a voluntary management buffer of 3.39 percent above the minimum 
requirement to absorb this additional capital requirement. In our analysis below, we transform these 
last two variables into an indicator variable that equals one if the observation belongs to the upper 
quartile of the variable’s distribution (for the sample of IRB banks after the introduction of the 
measure) and zero otherwise. 
Simple correlation analysis (not shown) indicates that IRB banks that are relatively more mortgage-
concentrated tend to have a lower Tier 1 capital ratio requirement. Consequently, for some banks 
these two factors may be balancing each other in determining the additional capital required by the 
RW add-on. Yet, correlations of these two variables with the variable measuring additional capital 
required by the RW add-on relative to RWA are positive (both slightly above 55 percent). There 
seems to be no relationship between the size of the capital buffer to RWA and the size of the 
voluntary management buffer above the minimum requirement (correlation coefficients of -9 
percent). The correlation analysis also shows that IRB banks that are expected to be affected more 
by the RW add-on tend to be the smaller IRB banks. Therefore, any finding that these IRB banks 
respond more aggressively in terms of mortgage loan pricing or curbing mortgage loan growth is 
unlikely to be driven by market power. 
6 RESULTS 
This section reports the results of the econometric analysis of the impact of the Belgian 
macroprudential RW add-on on IRB banks’ mortgage rates and mortgage loan growth. We consider 
several model specifications12 and provide robustness checks with respect to the sample period used.  
6.1 Baseline results 
Table 2 reports the results obtained from a baseline model without sensitivity variables. The left-
hand panel shows that in this baseline specification without bank-specific control variables, the RW 
add-on is estimated to have increased IRB banks’ mortgage rates on average by 12 basis points. 
When bank-specific control variables are added the point estimate on the RW add-on’s effect on IRB 
banks’ mortgage rates drops to on average 5 basis points. In both cases, the estimate is not 
statistically significant, however. This result is confirmed when we reduce the estimation sample to 
2013-2014, i.e. one year before and after the introduction of the measure.   
Table 2 – Impact of the RW add-on on mortgage lending: baseline results 
 Mortgage rate Mortgage loan growth 
 2012-2015 2013-2014 2012-2015 2013-2014 
                                                                
12 In addition, to assess the effects of potential outliers we have performed median regressions with bank and time fixed 
effects. The results were both quantitatively and qualitatively very similar to our standard panel regressions. 
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𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛) × 𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏) 12.705 5.296 11.167 6.007 -1.502 0.668 -1.475 -0.749 
 
(7.792) (6.970) (8.278) (9.436) (2.833) (2.478) (2.727) (2.870) 
Mortgage loans to total 
assets 
 1.240*  -0.061  -0.444**  0.184 
 (0.656)  (1.721)  (0.199)  (0.606) 
Log total assets  29.483**  32.833  -13.837**  0.170 
  (10.810)  (46.514)  (6.260)  (21.165) 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.311**  0.655  -0.103**  -0.097 
  (0.138)  (0.480)  (0.046)  (0.074) 
Swap rate 0.917*** 0.897*** 1.245* 1.046** 0.034 0.052 0.053 0.066 
 
(0.187) (0.199) (0.609) (0.474) (0.047) (0.037) (0.105) (0.121) 
Repricing segment 1 0.945** 0.867** 1.315 0.892 0.081 0.123** 0.131 0.157 
 
(0.334) (0.361) (1.282) (0.976) (0.070) (0.053) (0.208) (0.237) 
Repricing segment 2 1.037** 0.971** 1.584 1.387 0.003 0.028 0.054 0.063 
 
(0.405) (0.402) (0.985) (0.839) (0.057) (0.043) (0.136) (0.154) 
Repricing segment 3 0.398 0.426* 0.434 0.428 -0.013 -0.025 -0.010 -0.014 
 
(0.238) (0.221) (0.478) (0.464) (0.037) (0.031) (0.052) (0.051) 
Constant 99.571** -655.136** 82.650 -718.960 1.547 347.448** -0.821 -4.330 
 
(35.392) (285.585) (96.235) (1206.141) (6.268) (155.139) (15.612) (514.062) 
Adjusted R² 0.870 0.882 0.714 0.727 0.060 0.296 0.107 0.147 
Obs. 550 550 270 270 531 531 267 267 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. 𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛𝑡) is an indicator variable that equals one during the months in which the 
RW add-on is in place (from December 2013 onwards) and zero otherwise, 𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏𝑡) is an indicator variable that equals one for 
banks that use the IRB approach for determining the risk weights on mortgages and zero otherwise. All bank-specific control 
variables are lagged by one period. All specifications include bank and time dummies. Significance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 
percent, * 10 percent. 
The left-hand results further show that some additional bank characteristics explain differences in 
mortgage loan pricing in this baseline specification. First, banks that are more reliant on mortgage 
business tend to charge higher mortgage rates. Second, larger banks charge higher rates on their 
mortgage loans on average, probably due to their market power. Third, a higher loan to deposit ratio 
is associated with higher mortgage loan spreads. A possible explanation for this finding is that banks 
that fund a larger share of loans by sources other than customer deposits tend to price in the 
additional liquidity risk they bear. It should be noted that these effects are no longer statistically 
significant in the regressions on the sample period 2013-2014. Finally, mortgage rates are explained 
by the swap rate and by the repricing segment: during our sample period, mortgage loans with 
repricing periods up to 5 years tend to be priced at statistically significantly larger rates than 
mortgage loans with repricing periods longer than 10 years. The latter no longer holds for the 
reduced sample period, however. 
The right-hand panel of Table 2 presents the equivalent results for mortgage loan growth. The 
findings suggest that there has been no statistically significant impact of the macroprudential 
measure on mortgage loan growth. In the regressions on the full data sample, mortgage loan growth 
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is smaller for banks that have a larger focus on Belgian mortgage loans. This finding is consistent 
with banks targeting a stable balance sheet composition: when the share of Belgian mortgage loans 
rises (falls), the growth rate of the portfolio over the next year is reduced (raised). Also increasing 
balance sheet size tends to reduce mortgage loan growth. As the mortgage loan stock is highly 
correlated with total assets, this finding may in part be a mechanical effect: for a given amount of 
new loans, growth rates decrease when the mortgage loan stock increases. Finally, banks with a 
higher loan to deposit ratio exhibit lower mortgage loan growth, suggesting that banks that take 
more liquidity risk are more cautious in terms of expanding the mortgage portfolio. Alternatively, it 
could be that funding sources other than customer deposits are primarily used to finance 
investments other than traditional mortgage loans. Again, these results are no longer statistically 
significant for the shorter sample. Overall, the explanatory power of the regressions is much lower 
for loan growth than for mortgage rates. 
6.2 Sensitivity variables 
The baseline results on average did not show any significant impact of the macroprudential measure 
on mortgage lending: the point estimate of the impact on mortgage rates is about 5 basis points, 
whereas the impact on mortgage loan growth is very close to zero, and neither one of these estimates 
is statistically significant. The subsequent specifications extend the baseline model by adding 
sensitivity variables in the treatment effect. While IRB banks did not react to the RW add-on on 
average, it may be that banks’ reaction depends on balance sheet characteristics. In particular, we 
test whether banks that are affected relatively more by the macroprudential measures react more 
strongly in terms of mortgage loan pricing and/or curbing mortgage loan growth.  
Table 3 presents the results of these specifications for the mortgage rate: the variable name in the 
header specifies the Sens-variable that is interacted with the various indicator variables. For 
instance, the second and the fifth column of Table 3 show, for the full and reduced sample, 
respectively, that IRB banks’ reaction to the introduction of the RW add-on does not depend on the 
importance of Belgian mortgages in the balance sheet total. This is also the case for the voluntary 
management capital buffer over the minimum requirement. The sixth column of Table 3 provides 
some, albeit statistically not very strong, evidence that IRB banks for which the additional capital 
requirement implied by the RW add-on is more important raise their mortgage rates relatively more. 
For the remainder, the results are similar to the ones reported in the left-hand part of Table 2. 
Table 3 - Impact of the RW add-on on mortgage rates: sensitivity variables 
 Mortgage rate 
 2012-2015 2013-2014 
 
Mortgage 
loans to total 
Capital 
amount to 
Capital 
buffer to 
Mortgage 
to total 
Capital 
amount to 
Capital 
buffer to 
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assets RWA RWA assets RWA RWA 
𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛) × 𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏) 0.580 5.438 5.298 -20.742 1.931 6.616    
 
(8.856) (7.263) (6.777) (15.422) (9.065) (9.269)    
𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛) × 𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏) × 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠 0.060 -0.490 -0.009 0.573 12.706* -2.356    
 
(0.191) (3.146) (4.026) (0.364) (5.871) (5.568)    
𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛) × 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠 -0.490***   -0.754***   
 
(0.117)   (0.234)   
𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏) × 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠 1.106   7.400***   
 
(0.661) 
  
(1.842) 
 
              
Mortgage loans to total assets 1.174** 1.254* 1.240* -1.941 -1.098 -0.126    
 
(0.507) (0.696) (0.658) (1.336) (1.649) (1.716)    
Log total assets 35.381*** 29.705** 29.481** 20.944 11.338 30.213    
 
(8.429) (11.270) (11.149) (31.867) (44.189) (49.050)    
Loan to deposit ratio 0.421*** 0.309** 0.311** 1.158** 0.745 0.651    
 
(0.095) (0.140) (0.140) (0.456) (0.479) (0.487)    
Swap rate 0.820*** 0.897*** 0.897*** 0.757 1.154** 1.062**  
 
(0.193) (0.199) (0.199) (0.479) (0.491) (0.473)    
Repricing segment 1 0.756** 0.868** 0.867** 0.402 1.107 0.923    
 
(0.350) (0.361) (0.361) (1.016) (1.020) (0.970)    
Repricing segment 2 0.852* 0.972** 0.971** 1.061 1.527 1.407    
 
(0.406) (0.403) (0.404) (0.846) (0.859) (0.836)    
Repricing segment 3 0.429* 0.427* 0.426* 0.340 0.435 0.438    
 
(0.214) (0.222) (0.219) (0.460) (0.467) (0.460)    
Constant -795.754*** -660.657** -655.085** -496.873 -200.324 -656.854    
 
(223.586) (297.193) (293.557) (818.206) (1142.548) (1265.815) 
Adjusted R² 0.886 0.882 0.882 0.748 0.732 0.726    
Obs. 550 550 550 270 270 270  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. 𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛𝑡) is an indicator variable that equals one during the months in which the 
RW add-on is in place (from December 2013 onwards) and zero otherwise, 𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏𝑡) is an indicator variable that equals one for 
banks that use the IRB approach for determining the risk weights on mortgages and zero otherwise. The variable name in the 
header specifies the Sens-variable that is interacted with the various indicator variables. All bank-specific control variables 
are lagged by one period. All specifications include bank and time dummies. Significance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 
percent. 
The results on the specifications with sensitivity variables for the impact of the RW add-on on 
mortgage loan growth are reported in Table 4. While the results on the full sample in the left-hand 
part do not show any evidence of heterogeneous effects of the macroprudential measure, the results 
on the 2013-2014 sample in the right-hand part indicate that IRB banks’ reaction to the RW add-on 
in terms of curbing mortgage loan growth depends on the degree to which they are affected by the 
measure. In particular, IRB banks for which the mortgage exposures that are affected by the 
macroprudential measure account for a larger share of the balance sheet curb mortgage loan growth 
relatively more. This finding is confirmed when using the additional capital requirement variable: 
IRB banks for which the amount of additional capital required by the RW add-on is relatively larger, 
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exhibit lower mortgage loan growth. Finally, mortgage loan portfolios of IRB banks that have a 
larger capital buffer above minimum regulatory requirements tend to grow relatively faster after the 
introduction of the macroprudential measure. Like for the mortgage rate, the inclusion of the 
sensitivity variables does not affect the results on the remaining variables in the regression. 
Table 3- Impact of the RW add-on on mortgage loan growth: sensitivity variables 
 Mortgage loan growth 
 2012-2015 2013-2014 
 
Mortgage 
loans to total 
assets 
Capital 
amount to 
RWA 
Capital 
buffer to 
RWA 
Mortgage 
to total 
assets 
Capital 
amount to 
RWA 
Capital 
buffer to 
RWA 
𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛) × 𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏) 6.232 1.303 0.332 9.276** 0.588 -1.606 
 
(4.611) (2.404) (2.506) (3.781) (2.596) (2.681) 
𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛) × 𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏) × 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠 -0.190 -2.087 1.356 -0.279*** -4.168** 3.315* 
 
(0.108) (1.287) (1.430) (0.087) (1.667) (1.727) 
𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛) × 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠 0.189*   0.144   
 
(0.099)   (0.080)   
𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏) × 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠 -0.080   -1.371   
 
(0.344) 
  
(0.894) 
  
Mortgage loans to total assets -0.406*** -0.387* -0.445** 0.770 0.524 0.275 
 
(0.083) (0.201) (0.201) (0.441) (0.557) (0.588) 
Log total assets -14.087** -13.020** -13.375** 8.983 7.223 3.857 
 
(5.725) (5.793) (6.096) (19.588) (19.059) (19.756) 
Loan to deposit ratio -0.133* -0.111** -0.100** -0.199* -0.126* -0.091 
 
(0.069) (0.049) (0.046) (0.095) (0.068) (0.072) 
Swap rate 0.070 0.050 0.049 0.071 0.030 0.043 
 
(0.046) (0.036) (0.036) (0.125) (0.114) (0.109) 
Repricing segment 1 0.151** 0.127** 0.122** 0.151 0.087 0.113 
 
(0.067) (0.053) (0.053) (0.242) (0.224) (0.214) 
Repricing segment 2 0.050 0.030 0.030 0.055 0.017 0.034 
 
(0.053) (0.043) (0.046) (0.161) (0.147) (0.139) 
Repricing segment 3 -0.027 -0.021 -0.027 -0.013 -0.016 -0.028 
 
(0.035) (0.032) (0.034) (0.052) (0.048) (0.047) 
Constant 348.223** 327.013** 336.470** -201.186 -174.429 -91.711 
 
(143.803) (144.210) (151.612) (480.383) (463.752) (481.548) 
Adjusted R² 0.346 0.310 0.304 0.280 0.233 0.208 
Obs. 531 531 531 267 267 267 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. 𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛𝑡) is an indicator variable that equals one during the months in which the 
RW add-on is in place (from December 2013 onwards) and zero otherwise, 𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏𝑡) is an indicator variable that equals one for 
banks that use the IRB approach for determining the risk weights on mortgages and zero otherwise. The variable name in the 
header specifies the Sens-variable that is interacted with the various indicator variables. All bank-specific control variables 
are lagged by one period. All specifications include bank and time dummies. Significance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 
percent. 
6.3 Timing effects 
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The previous subsections showed that while the average impact of the macroprudential measure was 
not significant, there is some evidence of heterogeneous effects across IRB banks’ mortgage loan 
growth. We next investigate whether the impact of the RW add-on, while on average not significant 
over the entire evaluation period after its introduction, is particularly more pronounced in one of the 
two years after the introduction. It could for instance be that IRB banks’ reaction was initially strong 
but soon faded, or that IRB banks only reacted to the introduction of the measure with a lag. 
The left-hand part of Table 5 shows the results of this assessment for the mortgage rate. The second 
column of the table confirms the earlier finding that the RW add-on on average did not have a 
significant impact on mortgage rates: the impact is close to 5 basis points both in the first and the 
second year after the introduction of the measure. The fourth and the fifth column also confirm that 
IRB banks did not react heterogeneously depending on the relative amount of additional required 
capital due to the RW add-on or the capital buffer above the minimum requirement. The third 
column, however, shows that IRB banks with a larger share of mortgage loans to Belgian households 
in their balance sheet increased mortgage rates relatively more in the first year after the 
introduction of the measure and charge relatively lower rates in the second year. IRB banks with a 
lower reliance on affected mortgage loans, in contrast, initially charged relatively lower mortgage 
rates and increased their price of mortgage loans relatively more only in the second year after the 
introduction. A simulation of this model for the individual IRB banks in our sample shows that the 
initial impact on the mortgage rate of IRB banks with large reliance on mortgage loans to Belgian 
households is stronger than the subsequent impact on the mortgage rate of IRB banks with a lower 
share of mortgage loans in their balance sheet total. More specifically, the impact of the RW add-on 
on the mortgage rate ranges from -7 basis points to +21 basis points across individual IRB banks in 
the first year after the introduction, with the lower bound of the range not being statistically 
significantly different from zero. The range of impacts across individual IRB banks narrows in the 
second year, with values going from -12 basis points to +12 basis points. Neither the lower nor the 
upper bound of this range is significantly different from zero.  
Like for mortgage rates, the first column of the right-hand part of Table 5 confirms that the RW add-
on on average did not affect mortgage loan growth.  The remaining three columns of the right-hand 
panel show that the heterogeneous reactions across IRB banks in terms of curbing mortgage loan 
growth are only present in the first year after the introduction of the measure: IRB banks having a 
larger share of affected mortgage loans in their balance sheet and facing a relatively larger 
additional capital requirement due to the RW add-on reduce mortgage lending growth relatively 
more, and IRB banks with a larger voluntary management capital buffer exhibit stronger mortgage 
loan growth after the introduction of the measure. A simulation of the impact across individual IRB 
banks shows that the impact of the RW add-on on mortgage loan growth ranges from -5.96 
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percentage points to +4.13 percentage points in the first year after the introduction. While the latter 
value is not statistically significant, the above findings suggest that there may have been a shift 
from IRB banks with a large focus on mortgage loans to more diversified IRB banks. These effects 
are temporary, however, and no longer significant in the second year after the introduction. 
Table 5 - Impact of the RW add-on on mortgage lending: timing effects 
 
Mortgage rate Mortgage loan growth 
 
 Mortgage 
loans to 
total assets 
Capital 
amount to 
RWA 
Capital 
buffer to 
RWA 
 Mortgage 
to total 
assets 
Capital 
amount to 
RWA 
Capital 
buffer to 
RWA 
𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛) × 𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏)
× 𝐼(2014) 4.094 -15.286 3.698 4.913 0.470 7.345 1.455 -0.355    
(9.983) (10.605) (10.495) (9.798) (3.139) (4.386) (2.891) (3.032)    
𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛) × 𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏)
× 𝐼(2015) 6.619 19.737* 7.201 6.024 0.889 4.921 1.196 0.890    
(6.050) (9.267) (6.109) (5.441) (2.550) (6.933) (2.670) (2.655)    
𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛) × 𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏)
× 𝐼(2014) × 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠  0.651** 1.143 -3.083  -0.240** -3.135* 3.330*   
 (0.241) (4.184) (3.241)  (0.086) (1.502) (1.712)    
𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛) × 𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏)
× 𝐼(2015) × 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠  -0.566** -2.471 2.522  -0.135 -0.754 -0.454    
 (0.252) (3.504) (6.173)  (0.164) (1.523) (1.382)    
𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛))
× 𝐼(2014) × 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠  -0.994***    0.203**                
 (0.119)    (0.072)                
𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛))
× 𝐼(2015) × 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠  0.064    0.169                
 (0.187)    (0.149)                
𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏) × 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠  0.913    -0.079                
  (0.796)    (0.428)                
Mortgage loans to 
total assets 1.269* 1.310* 1.294* 1.243* -0.439** -0.404** -0.389* -0.422*   
 
(0.608) (0.682) (0.649) (0.604) (0.200) (0.138) (0.203) (0.197)    
Log total assets 29.506** 33.071*** 29.312** 28.440** -13.837** -13.437** -12.718** -12.609*   
 
(10.413) (8.307) (10.728) (10.341) (6.214) (5.975) (5.621) (5.853)    
Loan to deposit ratio 0.300** 0.318** 0.292** 0.296** -0.105* -0.127 -0.108* -0.099*   
 
(0.120) (0.129) (0.120) (0.123) (0.055) (0.096) (0.056) (0.054)    
Swap rate 0.902*** 0.888*** 0.914*** 0.910*** 0.052 0.062 0.042 0.044    
 
(0.207) (0.188) (0.213) (0.210) (0.035) (0.045) (0.032) (0.031)    
Repricing segment 1 0.874** 0.859** 0.896** 0.892** 0.125** 0.135** 0.113** 0.110**  
 
(0.369) (0.361) (0.377) (0.376) (0.049) (0.062) (0.049) (0.042)    
Repricing segment 2 0.973** 0.940** 0.983** 0.989** 0.029 0.040 0.024 0.019    
 
(0.403) (0.396) (0.404) (0.406) (0.042) (0.055) (0.043) (0.038)    
Repricing segment 3 0.426* 0.407* 0.427* 0.429* -0.025 -0.027 -0.021 -0.029    
 
(0.216) (0.208) (0.218) (0.216) (0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032)    
Constant -657.172** -758.884*** -654.335** -632.294** 347.220** 333.699** 320.631** 318.435**  
 
(276.058) (223.981) (283.567) (273.643) (153.202) (147.963) (139.556) (144.798)    
Adjusted R² 0.882 0.889 0.881 0.882 0.295 0.354 0.316 0.319    
Obs. 550 550 550 550 531 531 531 531  
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Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. 𝐼(𝑎𝑑𝑑-𝑜𝑛𝑡) is an indicator variable that equals one during the months in which the 
RW add-on is in place (from December 2013 onwards) and zero otherwise, 𝐼(𝑖𝑟𝑏𝑡) is an indicator variable that equals one for 
banks that use the IRB approach for determining the risk weights on mortgages and zero otherwise. The variable name in the 
header specifies the Sens-variable that is interacted with the various indicator variables. All bank-specific control variables 
are lagged by one period. All specifications include bank and time dummies. Significance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 
percent. 
7 CONCLUSION 
By analysing the impact of a sectoral macroprudential measure on mortgage loan lending, this paper 
contributes to the understanding of the potential impact of sectoral macroprudential capital 
requirements. Such evidence is crucial for improving the effectiveness of macroprudential policies, 
especially as analysis of the effects of sectoral capital requirements in general, and of those targeting 
real estate exposures in particular, is scant.  
Our results suggest that, in line with previous findings in the literature (e.g. Carlson, et al. (2013), 
Aiyar et al. (2014) and Basten and Koch (2017)), banks may react in a heterogeneous way to sectoral 
macroprudential capital requirements. In particular, banks that are relatively more affected by the 
additional requirement and that are more capital-constrained tend to respond stronger in terms of 
mortgage lending.  
However, the paper also shows that on average the impact of the macroprudential measure on 
mortgage lending was relatively limited both in terms of statistical and economic significance. As 
such, this is not surprising, as the objective of the measure was not to curb credit supply per se. On 
the one hand, this could be interpreted as a positive finding: the evidence shows that banks’ 
resilience to sectoral risk could be raised at low overall cost of foregone credit. On the other hand, 
this finding confirms the conclusion of Basten and Koch (2017) for the Swiss countercyclical capital 
buffer. As one of the explanatory factors for their overall small effects on mortgage lending, they 
argue that the Swiss countercyclical buffer amounted to only 1 percent of risk-weighted domestic 
residential mortgages. However, assuming a 10 percent minimum capital requirement, a back of the 
envelope calculation shows that the Belgian RW add-on of 5 percentage points, which raises the 
average risk weight from 10 percent to 15 percent, would on average be equivalent to a sectoral 
capital buffer requirement that is five times bigger than the Swiss measure. 
This raises the question on what should be the calibration of sectoral capital requirements if they 
were intended to have material impact on credit supply. Unfortunately, due to potential non-
linearities in banks’ reactions to regulatory requirements, our estimates do not allow drawing 
conclusions on whether a stronger calibration of the measure would have had more sizable effects on 
mortgage lending. Therefore, future work is needed on further assessing whether sectoral capital 
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requirements could be effective in curbing credit supply, or whether instead, alternative measures, 
such as borrower-based instruments (e.g. LTV caps) would be needed to achieve this objective. 
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